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ABA Explains Prosecutor’s 
Ethical Disclosure Duty
BY PeteR A. JOY AND 
KeViN c. McMUNiGAL
The ABA Standing Committee on Eth-ics and Professional Responsibility re-cently issued an advisory ethics opinion 
explaining that the ethical duty of the prosecu-
tor under Model Rule 3.8(d) to disclose exculpa-
tory evidence and information to the defendant 
is separate from, and more expansive than, the 
disclosure obligations under the Constitution. In 
Formal Opinion 09-454, available at http://www.
abanet.org/cpr/09-454.pdf, the standing commit-
tee explained the ethical standard and addressed 
the scope and timing of required disclosure as 
well as whether a prosecutor may demand waiver 
of the ethical disclosure duty as a condition to a 
guilty plea agreement.
Model Rule 3.8(d) requires a prosecutor to 
“make timely disclosure to the defense of all evi-
dence or information known to the prosecutor 
that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or 
mitigates the offense, and, in connection with sen-
tencing, disclose to the defense and the tribunal 
all unprivileged mitigating information known 
to the prosecutor.” In thoroughly examining the 
relationship between Rule 3.8(d) and the pros-
ecutor’s constitutional obligation under Brady v. 
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and the Brady line 
of cases, the standing committee addressed an is-
sue that the Ethics 2000 Commission sidestepped. 
The ABA’s ethics opinion is likely to be treated by 
all jurisdictions as highly persuasive authority on 
the prosecutor’s ethical disclosure duty, especially 
since almost every jurisdiction has adopted the 
language of Model Rule 3.8(d). It brings clarity 
to an area that has been confusing for prosecu-
tors, defense counsel, and courts. In this column, 
we look at the key features of the opinion and its 
implications for discovery in criminal cases.
scope of Disclosure Obligation
The opinion states that the analyses of the U.S. 
Supreme Court and lower courts in the Brady 
line of cases focus solely on the prosecutor’s dis-
closure obligations under the due process clause, 
which is separate from the ethical obligation im-
posed by Rule 3.8(d). These constitutional law 
cases “establish a constitutional minimum but do 
not purport to preclude jurisdictions from adopt-
ing more demanding disclosure obligations by 
statute, rule of procedure, or rule of professional 
conduct.”
Turning to the history of Rule 3.8(d), the opin-
ion notes that the drafters of the rule “made no 
attempt to codify the evolving constitutional case 
law” or incorporate a legal standard, but rather 
established an independent ethical duty of dis-
closure that “is more demanding than the consti-
tutional case law.” As support for this interpre-
tation, the opinion contrasts Model Rule 3.8(d) 
with ethics rules that incorporate a legal standard 
by prohibiting acts that are unlawful or prohibit-
ed by law. For example, Model Rule 3.4(a) makes 
it unethical for a lawyer to “unlawfully obstruct 
another party’s access to evidence or unlawfully 
alter, destroy or conceal a document or other 
material having potential evidentiary value.” 
(Emphasis added.) Model Rule 3.4(b) makes it 
unethical for a lawyer to “offer an inducement 
to a witness that is prohibited by law.” (Emphasis 
added.) Model Rule 3.8(d) does not incorporate 
the constitutional standard. It creates a separate, 
more expansive ethical disclosure duty.
The standing committee also stated that its in-
terpretation of Rule 3.8(d) is consistent with the 
ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, Prosecution 
Function, Standard 3-3.11(a), which requires the 
prosecutor “to make timely disclosure to the de-
fense, at the earliest feasible opportunity, of all 
evidence which tends to negate the guilt of the ac-
cused or mitigate the offense charged, or which 
would tend to reduce the punishment of the ac-
cused.” The Commentary accompanying Pros-
ecution Function Standard 3-3.11 states that the 
obligation under Standard 3-3.11(a) “is virtually 
identical to that imposed by ABA model ethics 
codes, [and] goes beyond the corollary duty im-
posed upon prosecutors by constitutional law.” 
Because the Rule 3.8(d) disclosure requirement 
is more demanding than constitutional case law, 
the standing committee stated that the ethics rule 
“requires prosecutors to steer clear of the consti-
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tutional line, erring on the side of caution.”
No Materiality Limitation. Formal Opinion 
09-454 states that Rule 3.8(d) mandates that  a 
prosecutor inform the accused of  all known in-
formation favorable to the defendant even if  the 
prosecutor does not believe that the information 
would affect the outcome of  the case at trial. The 
prosecutor’s constitutional obligation, as de-
fined by the Brady line of  cases, extends only to 
favorable evidence that is “material,” which the 
committee described as evidence “likely to lead 
to an acquittal.” According to the opinion, Rule 
3.8(d) does not have such a materiality limita-
tion, and while the ethical “obligation may over-
lap with a prosecutor’s other legal obligations” it 
is more expansive.
In evaluating  evidence and information, the 
opinion cautions the prosecutor to consider all 
“legally cognizable defenses” and not just those 
raised by defense counsel. There is not a “de 
minimis exception to the prosecutor’s disclosure 
duty,” and thus the prosecutor must turn over in-
formation even if  the prosecutor believes that it 
“has only a minimal tendency to negate the de-
fendant’s guilt, or that the favorable evidence is 
highly unreliable.”
Information as Well as Evidence. The ethics 
rule requires the prosecutor to disclose both evi-
dence and information “which tends to exculpate 
the accused when viewed independently and that 
which tends to be exculpatory when viewed in 
light of other evidence or information known to 
the prosecutor.” Thus, the ethical duty is not lim-
ited to admissible evidence, as in the Brady line of 
cases. Rather,  Rule 3.8(d) also mandates disclo-
sure of “information” that may be inadmissible 
but which “may lead a defendant’s lawyer to ad-
missible testimony or other evidence or assist him 
in other ways, such as in plea negotiations.”
timing
The opinion also addresses the timing of disclo-
sure. Disclosure must be made early enough so 
that defense counsel may use the evidence and 
information effectively. Reasoning that defense 
counsel can use favorable evidence and informa-
tion most effectively the sooner it is received, Rule 
3.8(d) requires disclosure of such evidence and in-
formation “as soon as reasonably practical” once 
it is known to the prosecutor.
The opinion examines how and when defense 
counsel may use favorable evidence and informa-
tion, such as conducting a defense investigation, 
deciding whether to raise a defense, determining 
trial strategy, and  advising the defendant whether 
to plead guilty. Thus, “[t]he obligation of timely 
disclosure of favorable evidence and information 
requires disclosure to be made sufficiently in ad-
vance of these and similar actions and decisions 
that the defense can effectively use the evidence 
and information.”
Focusing on how important defense counsel’s 
evaluation of the strength of the prosecutor’s case 
is to a defendant considering whether to plead 
guilty, the opinion states that timely disclosure 
under Rule 3.8(d) requires disclosure of evidence 
and information “prior to a guilty plea proceed-
ing, which may occur concurrently with the defen-
dant’s arraignment.” The Supreme Court in Unit-
ed States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622 (2002), appeared 
to reach a contrary conclusion about the prosecu-
tor’s Brady obligation prior to a guilty plea. If  the 
prosecutor believes that early disclosure or disclo-
sure of evidence or information may compromise 
an ongoing investigation or prosecution witness’s 
safety, the opinion advises the prosecutor to seek 
a protective order.
Waiver
The opinion also makes clear that a defendant 
may not waive or consent to the prosecutor’s ab-
rogation of the ethical disclosure duty, and “a 
prosecutor may not solicit, accept or rely on the 
defendant’s consent” as a mechanism to avoid 
Rule 3.8(d). The opinion notes that a third party 
may not absolve a lawyer of an ethical duty ex-
cept in specifically authorized instances, such as 
consent to certain conflicts of interest. Rule 3.8(d) 
does not explicitly permit third-party consent or 
waiver of the prosecutor’s disclosure obligation.
The opinion states that Rule 3.8(d) is designed 
both to protect the defendant and “to promote 
the public’s interest in fairness and reliability of 
the justice system, which requires that defendants 
be able to make informed decisions.” Allowing 
the prosecutor to obtain a defendant’s waiver of 
disclosure of favorable evidence and information 
undermines defense counsel’s ability to advise the 
defendant whether to plead guilty and may lead a 
factually innocent defendant to plead guilty.
In reaching this conclusion, the standing com-
mittee observed that whether the defendant may 
waive the constitutional right under Brady to re-
ceive exculpatory evidence appears unresolved 
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after the decision in Ruiz. In Ruiz, the Court held 
that a plea agreement could require the defendant 
to forgo the right to receive material evidence that 
could be used to impeach critical witnesses and 
information regarding any affirmative defenses. 
Nonetheless, the standing committee stated that 
even if  the courts were to hold that a defendant 
could entirely waive the right to favorable evi-
dence for constitutional purposes, “the ethical 
obligations established by Rule 3.8(d) are not co-
extensive with the prosecutor’s constitutional du-
ties of disclosure . . . .” 
If  the prosecutor seeks to withhold favorable 
evidence or information for a legitimate purpose, 
such as to prevent witness tampering, again the 
opinion advises the prosecutor to seek a protec-
tive order to limit what must be disclosed. Anoth-
er acceptable alternative in the committee’s view 
would be to “seek an agreement with the defense 
to return, and maintain the confidentiality of evi-
dence and information it receives.”
Knowledge, supervisory Responsibility, 
and sentencing
The opinion also addresses three other aspects 
of  the prosecutor’s ethical disclosure obliga-
tion: knowledge, the obligations of  supervisors, 
and the disclosure obligation in connection 
with sentencing.
Knowledge. Rule 3.8(d) requires disclosure of 
favorable evidence and information “known to 
the prosecutor.” Model Rule 1.0(f) defines knowl-
edge as “actual knowledge” that “may be inferred 
from [the] circumstances.” In a prior advisory 
ethics opinion, ABA Formal Opinion 95-396, 
the standing committee stated that because ac-
tual knowledge may be inferred from the circum-
stances, “[i]t follows . . .  that a lawyer may not 
avoid [knowledge of a fact] simply by closing her 
eyes to the obvious.” This view is consistent with 
ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, Prosecution 
Function, Standard 3-3.11(c), stating, “A pros-
ecutor should not intentionally avoid pursuit of 
evidence because he or she believes it will damage 
the prosecution’s case or aid the accused.” But, 
Formal Opinion 09-454 states that “Rule 3.8(d) 
does not establish a duty to undertake an investi-
gation in search of exculpatory evidence.”
While the prosecutor may not pursue a path of 
willful ignorance to avoid the ethical disclosure 
obligation, the knowledge requirement limits the 
ethical rule. For example, the opinion states that 
a prosecutor is not required “to conduct searches 
or investigations for favorable evidence that may 
possibly exist but of  which . . . [the prosecutor 
is] unaware.” As an example, the opinion uses a 
guilty plea made at the time of  the arraignment. 
At that point, the prosecutor must disclose all 
known evidence and information that would be 
relevant or useful in establishing possible de-
fenses or negating the government’s proof. “If  
the prosecutor has not yet reviewed voluminous 
files or obtained all police files, however, Rule 
3.8 does not require the prosecutor to review or 
request such files unless the prosecutor actually 
knows or infers from the circumstances, or it is 
obvious, that the files contain favorable evidence 
or information.”
Supervisory Responsibility. The ethics opinion 
also provides guidance to lawyers with manage-
rial responsibility in the prosecutor’s office. Those 
supervisory lawyers are obligated to ensure that 
subordinate lawyers comply with Rule 3.8(d). The 
supervisory lawyer who directly oversees a trial 
prosecutor must ensure that the trial prosecutor 
meets his or her ethical disclosure obligation. A 
supervisory lawyer is “subject to discipline for or-
dering, ratifying or knowingly failing to correct 
discovery violations.” The opinion advises such 
managerial lawyers to promote compliance with 
Rule 3.8(d) by adequately training subordinate 
lawyers and by having internal office procedures 
that facilitate compliance.
As an example, the opinion discusses a case in 
which work is distributed among several different 
prosecutors. In such a situation, the opinion ad-
vises  an internal policy requiring all prosecutors 
on the case to convey all files containing favorable 
evidence or information to the prosecutor respon-
sible for discovery. Another useful internal policy 
would require that favorable information con-
veyed orally to a prosecutor be memorialized in 
writing. The opinion also recommends requiring 
a prosecutor who obtains information favorable 
to a defendant in another case to provide it to the 
colleague responsible for that other case.
Disclosure for Sentencing. In connection to 
sentencing, the opinion points out four ways in 
which the duty to disclose to the defense and the 
tribunal all unprivileged mitigating information 
known to the prosecutor differs from the disclo-
sure obligation that applies before a guilty plea 
or trial. First, the information differs because the 
duty requires disclosure of mitigating information 
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recidivism reduction. Research has validated that 
belief. An evaluation conducted by Professor 
Bruce Western of Harvard University concluded 
that ComALERT graduates were substantially less 
likely to be rearrested, reconvicted, or reincarcerat-
ed than parolees in a matched control group (avail-
able at http://www.wjh.harvard.edu/soc/faculty/
western/pdfs/report_1009071.pdf).
As reentry programs proliferate, research will 
prove critical in identifying those aspects of reentry 
programs that work best. The National Institute 
of Justice (NIJ) apparently recognizes the impor-
tance of this issue. For example, the NIJ is cur-
rently funding a multiyear comprehensive evalua-
tion of the Serious and Violent Offender Reentry 
Initiative, a collaborative federal effort to improve 
reentry outcomes along criminal justice, employ-
ment, education, health, and housing dimensions. 
The study is being jointly conducted by the Urban 
Institute and the Research Triangle Institute.
Understanding the mounting interest in such 
reentry programs and in how to implement them 
successfully, the Criminal Justice Section spon-
sored a Reentry Summit on November 5, in 
Washington, D.C. Criminal justice practitioners 
who run reentry programs in a variety of practice 
settings around the country convened to discuss 
all aspects of their programs, including creation, 
expansion, trouble-shooting, and measures of 
success. Those contemplating launching their own 
reentry programs gained practical know-how, 
and those with programs already up and running 
profited greatly from the stimulating exchange of 
ideas and information.
On November 6, the Section further explored 
the myriad issues surrounding reentry at this 
year’s Sentencing Advocacy, Practice and Reform 
Institute. The well-attended conference had a 
great cross-section of panelists offering their ex-
pertise and insights. Among the topics discussed 
were the Second Chance Act, supervised release, 
and collateral consequences of convictions.
This last topic is also now the focus of a new 
grant secured by the Section. The NIJ awarded 
the Section $700,000 over the next three years 
to conduct a comprehensive all-states survey of 
adult collateral consequences and create an eas-
ily accessible and searchable database of the col-
lected information. This ambitious project is a 
natural follow-up to the reference work produced 
through a collaboration of the ABA and the Pub-
lic Defender Services for the District of Colum-
bia, Internal Exile (ABA 2009), a compilation of 
the collateral consequences arising under federal 
statutes and regulations. Former chair of the Sec-
tion as well as chair of the ABA Commission on 
Effective Criminal Sanctions, Professor Stephen 
Saltzburg of George Washington School of Law, 
with his deep reserves of both expertise and stam-
ina, will serve as chair of the advisory board for 
the new project. Once up and running, the new 
Web-based national inventory of collateral conse-
quences (covering areas such as employment bars, 
housing restrictions, curtailment of voting rights, 
limits on education loans and scholarships, and 
deportation, to name but a few) will inform the 
public discourse on reentry and help guide policy 
makers as they consider the appropriate role of 
sanctions and disqualifiers.
Just as research is already helping us refine re-
entry programs and make them more effective, 
research can also help policy makers in identify-
ing those collateral consequences that make the 
most (and the least) sense from a public safety 
standpoint. One of the frequent and most seri-
ous stumbling blocks to an ex-prisoner’s suc-
cessful reentry into the community is his or her 
inability to secure employment. The reasons for 
this are many, but among them is an employer’s 
fear that the ex-prisoner will reoffend while on 
the job. When developing policy on employment 
restrictions and the availability of criminal histo-
ry records, jurisdictions must balance the public 
interest in, on the one hand, preserving the safety 
of the workplace, including customers and other 
employees, and, on the other hand, ensuring that 
ex-offenders obtain jobs and become contributing 
members of society. Recent research may provide 
empirical evidence to inform that discussion.
Professor Alfred Blumstein, a preeminent 
criminologist and a 2007 winner of the Stock-
holm Prize in Criminology, and Kiminori Naka-
mura, a doctoral student at the Heinz College of 
Carnegie Mellon University, are conducting an 
NIJ-funded study on the “redemption point”—
that point in time from the commission of the 
crime when a person with a criminal record who 
remained free of further contact with the criminal 
justice system is of no greater risk to committing 
a new crime than any counterpart of the same age. 
The initial findings of their recidivism risk study 
are presented in “Redemption in the Presence of 
Widespread Criminal Background Checks,” in 
Criminology 47(2) (May 2009). Their ongoing re-
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search has clear implications for employers strug-
gling to make hiring decisions on individuals with 
criminal backgrounds.
As our nation over the last few decades ex-
panded its use of incarceration as a way to ad-
dress crime, we perhaps did not adequately fore-
see some of the social and fiscal consequences of 
this prison-based strategy. Going forward, let’s 
keep our eyes open. Research can help us craft 
intelligent policies with regard to reentry. An esti-
mated 95 percent of all inmates will eventually be 
released from prison. Let’s do all we can to ensure 
that they develop a stake in society, and don’t put 
a stake through it. n
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